




RACE, DISCRIMINATION AND 
DIVERSITY IN SOUTH AFRICA
Jeremy Seekings
CSSR Working Paper No. 194
May 2007
Jeremy Seekings is Professor of Political Studies and Sociology at the University 
of Cape Town.  He has held visiting appointments at Yale and Oxford universities. 
His books include Heroes or Villains? Youth Politics in South Africa in the 1980s 
(Johannesburg, 1993), The UDF: A History of the United Democratic Front in South 
Africa, 1983-2001 (Cape Town, London and Athens, OH, 2000), and Class, Race and 
Inequality in South Africa (co-authored with Nicoli Nattrass, New Haven and London, 
2005, and Pietermaritzburg, 2006).  From 2001 to 2006 he edited the journal Social 
Dynamics, and is currently co-editor of the International Journal of Urban and Regional 
Research.  He is presently conducting research on the politics of welfare state-building 
in developing countries.
This paper was discussed at a conference on “Legal and Political Remedies to 
Discrimination”, at the University of California, Los Angeles, February 2007.







The end of apartheid has brought a resurgence of research into racial identities, 
attitudes and behaviour in South Africa.  The legacy of systematic racial 
ordering and discrimination under apartheid is that South Africa remains deeply 
racialised, in cultural and social terms, as well as deeply unequal, in terms of 
the distribution of income and opportunities.  South Africans continue to see 
themselves in the racial categories of the apartheid era, in part because these 
categories have become the basis for post-apartheid ‘redress’, in part because 
they retain cultural meaning in everyday life.  South Africans continue to inhabit 
social worlds that are largely defined by race, and many express negative views 
of other racial groups.  There has been little racial integration in residential 
areas, although schools provide an important opportunity for inter-racial 
interaction for middle-class children.  Experimental and survey research 
provide little evidence of racism, however.  Few people complain about racial 
discrimination, although many report everyday experiences that might be 
understood as discriminatory.  Racial discrimination per se seems to be of 
minor importance in shaping opportunities in post-apartheid South Africa.  Far 
more important are the disadvantages of class, exacerbated by neighbourhood 
effects: poor schooling, a lack of footholds in the labour market, a lack of 
financial capital.  The relationship between race and class is now very much 
weaker than in the past.  Overall, race remains very important in cultural and 
social terms, but no longer structures economic advantage and disadvantage.  





In a world in which racial labeling and discrimination are regrettably 
commonplace, the South African system of apartheid stood out as an extreme 
attempt to order a society explicitly and systematically according to racial 
categories.  Many aspects of apartheid were not unique to South Africa.  In the 
aftermath of slavery, colonial (and especially settler) societies in Africa 
generally practiced racial segregation.  In the USA and Brazil, most black 
people were denied the vote through literacy and other qualifications (until the 
1960s in the USA, and as late as the 1980s in Brazil).  In much of Latin America 
and the Caribbean, as well as the southern states of the USA, white people 
owned the land whilst landless black people worked for them.  Racism and 
racial discrimination have been almost universal in the twentieth century.  The 
concept of ‘apartheid’ has even been applied to cities in the USA in the late 
twentieth century.  Indeed, apartheid – as implemented by the National Party 
government in power from 1948 to 1994 – was built on the foundations of 
racialised colonial and settler societies in which a minority of white settlers – 
farmers and workers – lived amidst an indigenous or ‘native’ majority.  What 
made apartheid unique was its systematic depth and breadth, as the powers of a 
modern state were deployed to order society along ‘racial’ lines, going far 
beyond racism and racial discrimination to generalized social engineering 
around state-sanctioned racial ideology and legislation. 
 
It would be astonishing if post-apartheid South African society was not shaped 
profoundly by the experience of apartheid, remaining distinctive in terms of the 
social, political or economic roles played by ‘race’.  Despite the rhetorical 
commitment to non-racialism of the major ‘liberation movement’ (the African 
National Congress), together with its allies inside the country, during the 
struggle against apartheid, and despite the abolition of apartheid-era racial 
legislation and the adoption of a widely lauded constitution, race does indeed 
remain ever-present in contemporary South Africa.  To a large extent this is due 
to a deep-rooted and enduring consciousness of race in society.  To some extent 
it is due to factors that reflect choices made by post-apartheid political elites: the 
use of the race card in public life, including in politics, and new policies of 
racial discrimination involving, especially, affirmative action in employment, 
with the stated objective of redressing the disadvantages experienced by non-
white South Africans (either collectively or individually) under apartheid. 
 
Racial discrimination in economic life against black people has been largely 
ended in South Africa.  Some lingering discrimination by white employers 
against black people no doubt persists, but it is probably more than offset by the 
effects of affirmative action.  Persistent racial inequalities reflect class 
stratification rather than racial discrimination, as we have argued at length 
elsewhere (Seekings and Nattrass, 2005).  Income is distributed within the 
African population almost as unequally as within the population as a whole, as 
opportunities have expanded rapidly for many African people to move into 
better-paid occupations at the same time as many others languish in poverty 
because of poor schooling and chronic unemployment.  Yet society remains 
highly racialised.  Inter-racial contact, yet alone marriage, remains very limited. 
 
Telles (2005), in his recent study of Brazil, collates a wide range of data 
showing how important race is, but in some rather than all respects.  Contrary to 
the ideology of ‘racial democracy’, racial discrimination seems significant in 
economic life.  Yet, in terms of identities and social interactions, Brazilians are 
remarkably non-racial.  Telles distinguishes between vertical relationships, in 
which race is important, and horizontal ones, in which it is not.  Post-apartheid 
South Africa appears to be the opposite of this.  The vertical dimension of 
racism appears to have been largely eliminated (or perhaps even reversed), but 
the horizontal dimension appears resilient (or perhaps has even increased, as 
racial differences within the increasingly multi-racial middle class have grown 
and become more visible).  In this paper, I examine the evidence for this. 
 
 
Apartheid and Democracy in South Africa 
 
The foundation of apartheid was the system of racial categorization enshrined in 
law by the 1950 Population Registration Act (and subsequent amendments).  
The Act provided for all South Africans to be classified into one of three basic 
racial categories:  
A white person is one who in appearance is, or who is generally 
accepted as, a white person, but does not include a person who, 
although in appearance obviously a white person, is generally 
accepted as a Coloured person.  A native is a person who is in fact or 
is generally accepted as a member of any aboriginal race or tribe of 
Africa.  A Coloured person is a person who is not a white person nor a 
native. 
Later, a fourth category – Indian – was added, for people of South Asian 
descent, the label ‘native’ was replaced by the labels ‘Bantu’ and ‘Black’.1  
Racial classification was recorded in official identity documentation.  From 
1970, the ‘black’ category was further sub-divided into ethnic or linguistic 
groups (such as Zulu and Xhosa) (Christopher, 2002). 
 
                                                 
1 The four-category schema had been used in the censuses of 1921, 1936 and 1946. 
This racial categorisation was largely ‘common-sensical’ and consensual, based 
on agreed and broadly co-terminous factors (descent, language or culture, and 
appearance).  In difficult or contested cases, classification was not based on 
either descent or purely biological markers.  Instead, the cultural markers of 
‘appearance’ and ‘general acceptance’ were most important.  Whilst informal 
‘rules’ about appearance – including about skin colour or hair – were used, they 
were used inconsistently, and appearance was generally interpreted in terms of 
social standing or class.  Overall, judgements about social standing (friends, 
work, name, dress, deportment, tastes) were most important in contested cases.  
The 1951 national Population Census provided the first opportunity for mass 
racial classification.  Race was determined by census enumerators, who had no 
specific expertise and received no special training.  In ambiguous cases, 
therefore, classification reflected the prevailing social prejudices of white 
people.  People could appeal to a Race Classification Appeal Board.  Although 
the Appeal Board tended to find in favour of the applicant, there were very few 
appeals, reflecting the generally consensual basis of classification (Posel, 2001a, 
2001b). 
 
Ambiguous and contested cases generally involved the very small minority of 
‘coloured’ people.  ‘Coloured’ was a composite and diverse category including 
the descendents of relationships between white and black people, the 
descendents of ‘Malay’ slaves brought from South-east Asia (categorised 
separately in 1951 but not thereafter), and (after 1970) descendents of the 
indigenous Khoi and San who inhabited the Western Cape prior to the arrival of 
either white or black people and did not speak Bantu languages.  Whilst 
segregation between white and black preceded apartheid, introducing 
segregation between white and coloured was a primary objective of the 
apartheid state. 
 
Systematic racial classification was required because the apartheid project 
entailed three broad objectives.  The first was ideological: to maintain racial 
purity by preventing the ‘mixing’ or ‘dilution’ of ‘white blood’.  There should 
be no inter-racial sex, and hence no inter-racial marriage.  To prevent 
temptation, there should be residential segregation by race.  Pre-1948 legislation 
prohibiting sex and marriage between white and black people was extended to 
cover white and coloured people.  The 1950 Group Areas Act led to the forced 
removal of almost one million people, mostly coloured people removed from 
mixed residential areas when they were declared ‘white’ areas.  In hospitals, 
patients were supposed to be handled by nurses of the appropriate racial group 
(although almost all doctors were white).  Segregation was extended to other 
areas of social interaction: education (with separate schools and universities for 
each racial group), transport (separate railway carriages), and most municipal 
facilities such as parks and beaches.  Where complete segregation was not 
possible, partial segregation was implemented through providing separate 
entrances and counters (at stations and post offices, for example).  
 
The second objective was to ensure and then protect the privileged economic 
position of the white minority.  The apartheid state inherited policies that 
reserved land for white ownership and better-paid occupations for white people 
(through the ‘colour bar’).  Under apartheid, these were enforced more 
emphatically, but the emphasis shifted to racial discrimination in public 
education.  White children from poorer white families were provided with the 
skills required to sustain a privileged position in the labour market.  The massive 
investment in the education of white children was so successful that the colour 
bar became largely redundant.  At the same time as protecting wages, the 
apartheid state sought to protection the profits earned by white-owned capitalist 
enterprises (including, especially, farmers).  Whilst the cost of ‘white’ or skilled 
labour was inflated under apartheid, the cost of ‘black’ or unskilled labour was 
depressed.  ‘Influx control’ policies and the pass laws restricted where black 
people were allowed to live and hence work, ensuring not only that urbanization 
among black people was curtailed (in stark contrast to most other parts of the 
developing world at the same time), but also that white farmers were guaranteed 
a supply of labour despite being unable to pay competitive wages.  
 
The third objective of apartheid was to maintain the political dominance of the 
white minority.  In the 1950s, the apartheid state was preoccupied with 
removing coloured voters from the existing common voters roll, but thereafter 
the primary concern was the political threat posed by the already 
disenfranchised ‘native’ or black majority, i.e. the ‘swart gevaar’ (or ‘black 
danger’, in Afrikaans).  The apartheid state sought to restrict the political rights 
of black people to the native reserves, or ‘bantustans’ or ‘homelands’ as they 
were later renamed.  Powers were devolved first to appointed chiefs, and later to 
semi-elected but largely compliant banstustan governments.  In 1975, the 
Transkei homeland was the first to become notionally ‘independent’, with its 
citizens losing South African citizenship. 
 
Apartheid not only ordered but also transformed South African society.  
Discriminatory education and privileged family backgrounds provided white 
children with the advantages of class, such that explicit racial discrimination in 
the labour market became unnecessary.  Economic and industrial policies 
designed to reduce dependence on black workers and boost incomes for (white) 
skilled workers and professionals resulted in capital-intensive growth at the 
same time as rising unemployment (among unskilled black people), and thus 
both inequality and poverty.  Forced removals of the unemployed and their 
dependents (i.e. the ‘surplus population’) from white-owned farms and towns to 
the reserves resulted in massive over-crowding and the consequent destruction 
of a smallholding agrarian society in those areas. 
 
But apartheid was unable to transform the country’s demographics.  The white 
minority was too small to sustain economic growth: employers demanded semi-
skilled and then skilled black workers to produce goods and a larger pool of 
consumers to buy them.  From the 1970s, and especially in the 1980s, the 
apartheid state began to dismantle racial discrimination in the labour market, to 
invest more heavily in secondary schooling for black children, and to lift 
restrictions on the growth of an urban black middle class and a stable, urban 
working-class.  ‘Petty apartheid’ – i.e. the segregation of parks and other public 
facilities – was dismantled.  Racial discrimination in public welfare was slowly 
reduced.  In 1984, the apartheid state reversed its earlier policies and sought to 
co-opt the small coloured and Indian minorities into an anti-black coalition, 
through racially segregated representation in a Tricameral Parliament (with 
separate chambers for white, coloured and Indian Members of Parliament).  
Finally, in the face of country-wide revolt from below and intensified 
international pressures, the apartheid state began to negotiate an end to all 
aspects of apartheid.  In 1994, South Africans – including in the notionally 
independent homelands – voted in the country’s first non-racial elections. 
 
Much of the apartheid-era racial legislation was abolished during the transitional 
period, i.e. prior to 1994, and the post-apartheid government led by the ANC 
completed the process.  Despite the abolition of the Population Registration Act, 
however, a battery of new legislation has been introduced providing for racial 
discrimination in favour of non-white, and especially African, people.  The 1998 
Employment Equity Act and 2003 Black Empowerment Act have the effect of 
requiring private employers to transfer equity to new owners and to appoint new 
employees on the basis of race, privileging the members of ‘designated groups’, 
especially African people.  The criteria for racial group classification are not 
defined, and employers (as well as educational institutions that discriminate by 
race in student admissions) seem to shift uneasily between allowing people to 
self-classify and threatening that ‘false’ self-classification is a disciplinary 
offence!2  The ideological, political and economic objectives of post-apartheid 
policies of racial discrimination remain opaque: the effect is to accelerate very 
rapidly the growth of an African elite and middle-class, but it is unclear what is 
the relative importance of a concern to stabilize capitalist democracy, Africanist 
ideology, social justice and the redress of previous disadvantage, and 
straightforward greed and self-interest on the part of the new political elite. 
                                                 
2 This is an important topic for further research.  Cases of ambiguous classification are likely to be more 
common among the current and aspirant middle classes than among the population as a whole.  It is said that 
members of the Constitutional Court worry that racial classification would be contested and they would have to 
formulate an explicit approach to the matter.  
Race and Identity after Apartheid 
 
Post-apartheid South Africa is characterized by the dual legacies of apartheid: 
cultural diversity and economic inequality that both have racial characteristics.  
Apartheid entrenched racialised identities and fostered racial division at the 
same time as exacerbating inequality in the distribution of income.  The post-
apartheid state faces the challenge of tackling these legacies of racialised social 
engineering. 
 
South Africans tend to see their society in racialised terms.  Asked about racial 
identities, only a tiny proportion of South Africans aver the apartheid-era 
categories of ‘African’ (replacing, in official use, the former label ‘black’), 
white, coloured and Indian.  How people categorise themselves also accords 
closely with how (they say) other people see them.3  In other words, there 
remains a close correlation between official apartheid-era racial classifications, 
post-apartheid self-classification and post-apartheid classification by other 
people.  This does not mean, however, that these are the only identities that 
South Africans have.  Asked who they are, South Africans will often say they 
are South Africa, and that they are proud of this (see Grossberg et al., 2006).  
Increasingly, they are likely to employ class identities (working class, middle 
class, poor).  And many also use non-racial cultural identities, including 
religious ones (Christian, Muslim) or ethnic ones (Xhosa, Zulu, Afrikaans). 
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Note: ‘African’ and ‘black’ were categories chosen by people who were or would have been classified 
as black under apartheid; they are reported separately here because it is possible that self-assessed skin 
colour correlates with the choice between ‘African’ and ‘black’.  Source: 2005 Cape Area Study. 
 
Figure 1: Self-assessed skin colour by self-reported race, Cape Town, 2005 
                                                 
3 This and the next paragraph are based on the findings of the 2005 Cape Area Study, conducted in Cape Town 
(see Seekings et al., 2005). 
Racial categories themselves mean different things to different people.  Asked 
for reasons for their racial self-classification, white South Africans typically 
refer to their physical appearance or descent.  African and coloured South 
Africans do not refer to physical appearance or descent, but instead emphasise 
‘culture’ (and, in the case of coloured people, the categorization of the apartheid 
period).  There is little difference in the distribution of self-assessed skin colour 
among African and coloured people, but white people see their skin colour as 
distinctly paler (see Figure 1).  (Interviewers were also asked to assess the 
respondents’ skin colour, and their assessments accorded closely with the 
respondents’ self-assessments).  Whilst almost all South Africans use racial 
categorization in everyday life, it seems to be white South Africans who hold 
onto biological conceptions of race. 
 
This is in part because white South Africans – like white people in many other 
contexts – take their culture for granted.  Culturally, whiteness is invisible to 
most white people (Steyn, 2001).  African people are much more conscious of 
their cultural distinctiveness.  Speaking different languages at home, often 
attending different churches, and perhaps above all retaining distinctive beliefs 
about, for example, ancestors, witchcraft (see Ashforth, 2005) and family 
(Russell, 2003).  The end of apartheid has also been accompanied by a 
resurgence of coloured identity.  Under apartheid, coloured identity was defined 
by the intermediate status of coloured people in the racial hierarchy: aspirations 
to assimilation into white society and fears of relegation to the status of African 
people combined with widespread feelings of shame as well as marginality.  
After apartheid, a racialised conception of ‘colouredness’ has grown stronger, 
with renewed affinities to whiteness and deepened racism towards African 
people (Adhikari, 2006). 
 
In recognition of cultural diversity, post-apartheid nation-building in South 
Africa employed the discourse of the multi-cultural ‘rainbow nation’ rather than 
building a common non-racial South African national identity.  The national 
anthem thus combines elements of both the hymn associated with the liberation 
movements and the apartheid-era anthem, and is sung in four major languages.  
Official multi-culturalism serves, however, to reproduce the culturally-based 
racial identities of the past. 
 
In 1998, the then deputy-president Thabo Mbeki emphasized racial inequality in 
a controversial speech in which he described South Africa as comprising ‘two 
nations, the one black and the other white’.   
One of these nations is white, relatively prosperous, regardless of 
gender or geographical dispersal.  It has ready access to a developed 
economic, physical, educational, communication and other 
infrastructure.  This enables it to argue that, except for the persistence 
of gender discrimination against women, all members of this national 
have the possibility of exercising their right to equal opportunity, and 
the development opportunities to which the Constitution of 1993 
committed our country.  The second and larger nation of South Africa 
is black and poor, with the worst-affected being women in rural areas, 
the black rural population in general and the disabled.  This nation 
lives under conditions of grossly underdeveloped economic, physical, 
educational, communication and other infrastructure.  It has virtually 
no possibility of exercising what in reality amounts to a theoretical 
right to equal opportunity, that right being equal within the black 
nation only to the extent that it is equally incapable of realization. 
(Hansard, 29 May 1998, col. 3378) 
Mbeki here was drawing on a tradition of referring to ‘two nations’ that 
originated in mid-nineteenth century, class-divided Britain (in the writings of 
Benjamin Disaraeli) and was popularized in still race-divided USA in the late 
twentieth century. 
 
For Mbeki, the project of ‘nation-building’ in South Africa entailed bridging the 
divides between the racially-defined ‘nations’ above.  ‘Nation building is the 
construction of the reality and the sense of common nationhood which would 
result from the abolition of disparities in the quality of life among South 
Africans based on the racial, gender and geographic inequalities we all inherited 
from the past’, he said in 1998 (quoted in Roefs, 2006: 77).  Note that there is no 
mention here of class inequalities.  The implication is that the ‘national 
question’ – defined in racial terms – has precedence above the ‘social question’ 
of class-based inequalities.  Programmes of race-based affirmative action are to 
have precedence over pro-poor or inter-class redistribution. 
 
On average, white South Africans remain privileged after apartheid, and most 
African people remain poor.  But data on the average person within racial 
categories ignores the rapid increase in inequality within those categories, 
especially within the African population.  The rapid growth of the African elite 
and middle class, at the same time as unemployment locks many other African 
people into chronic poverty, has resulted in incomes (and opportunities) within 
the African population being distributed nearly as unequally as in South Africa 
as a whole, and this inequality is as extreme as anywhere in the world.  It would 
be more appropriate to view South Africa in terms of three ‘nations’: the almost 
entirely African poor, the mostly African working classes, and the multi-racial 
middle-classes and elites (see Seekings and Nattrass, 2005).4 
 
                                                 
4 The two nations description is especially inappropriate in the Western Cape and Cape Town, where the 
demographics of race and class are distinct.  
The growth of the African middle class has been the result primarily of the 
deracialisation of education and of the labour market, and secondly of 
discriminatory post-apartheid policies of affirmative action.  The public service 
implemented affirmative action rapidly after 1994.  The 1998 Employment 
Equity Act required mid-sized and large private employers to set targets for the 
transformation of their workforce and to report on their progress in achieving 
these targets.  The growth of an African elite has been the result primarily of 
discriminatory policies of ‘black economic empowerment’ in business.  The 
2003 Black Economic Empowerment Act set in motion a massive redistribution 
of corporate ownership from the old white elite to the emerging black elite.  The 
African middle class and elite are the agents of a reinvention of African culture: 
‘African’ names and dress are adopted, and supposedly traditional rituals are 
practiced with new-found fervour. 
 
‘Post-apartheid’ South Africa is thus characterized by a paradoxical combination 
of features.  Race is no longer coterminous with class, with opportunities for 
upward mobility opening rapidly for some African people whilst opportunities 
remain limited for many others.  Class is increasingly important.  Racism has 
almost certainly declined.  Yet race retains its central position in identities and 
culture, and political parties can and do continue to play the race card.  The 
priority attached to the rhetoric and policies of affirmative action suggests that 
the national question takes precedence over the social question, but at the same 
time African elites rhetorically recommit themselves to non-racialism and a 
concern for the poor. 
 
Maré has wondered how far the ‘ordinariness’ of racial consciousness (or ‘race-
thinking’) in post-apartheid South Africa is the consequence of post-apartheid 
policies of racial categorization. 
To meet with the requirements of the Employment Equity Act, to gain 
admission to universities, to claim travel allowances, to play in sports 
teams, to provide information for tax purposes, to ask the National 
Research Foundation for funding, to register births and so on, each 
requires a statement of race belonging. … There is no opportunity in 
these forms to avoid the issue.  At every level there is an official, from 
the government minister responsible to the company personnel officer 
or employment equity manager, to monitor adherence or compliance 
or progress.  No provision is made for alternatives to the basic ‘four 
races’ of apartheid South Africa, or to reject such classification.  
Leaving the space blank, which remarkably few seem to do, means 
that someone else is required to complete it to balance the books. 
(Maré, 2001: 82) 
Even if the state was to abandon any such administrative categorization, it is 
hard to imagine that South Africans’ acute consciousness of race would vanish.  
South Africans’ racialised identities and perceptions of others have strong roots 
in civil society.  ‘Race-thinking’ persists uneasily alongside a strong 
commitment to transcending the racial divisions of apartheid.  It is the deep-
rootedness of race-thinking (among African as much as if not more than white 




Racism and ‘Race Relations’ 
 
South African ‘race relations’ was a prominent topic for research until the mid-
1960s (MacCrone, 1949; Kuper et al., 1958; Crijns, 1959; van der Berghe, 
1967), but thereafter social scientists largely neglected race in favour of Marxian 
studies of class formation and conflict.  Pyschologists continued to use social 
distance scales in studies, mostly conducted among samples of university 
students (see surveys in Foster and Louw-Potgieter, 1991), whilst a trickle of 
studies began to explore the effects of inter-racial contact on attitudes in the later 
apartheid period (Preston-Whyte, 1976; Foster and Finchilescu, 1986). 
 
Since the end of apartheid, research has diversified in a range of new directions, 
despite the fact that most people continue to live in residential areas that are, in 
practice, racially segregated, and most children continue to attend schools with 
children of the same ‘race’.  Indeed, one of the most striking findings of post-
apartheid survey research is how few South Africans enjoy much inter-racial 
contact.  In a survey conducted in 2000-01 by James Gibson (see Gibson, 2004), 
white, coloured and Indian respondents were asked a series of questions about 
African people, and African people the same questions about white people.  
Only 16 percent of the respondents, weighted appropriately, reported having ‘a 
great deal’ of contact at work with members of the designated group, whilst only 
6 percent reported having ‘a great deal’ of such contact outside work.  Another 
13 percent reported having ‘some’ such contact at work and another 13 percent 
reported having some such contact outside of work.  Eight percent said they ate 
meals ‘quite often’ with members of the designated group.  A tiny 4 percent said 
they had ‘quite a number’ of friends in the designated group, with another 20 
percent saying they had ‘only a small number’ of such friends.  Overall, one in 
three South Africans reported any of the above; two out of three South Africans 
said that they had little or no contact with members of the designated group. 
 
 













all of my 5 closest friends are [same race as me]
most of my 5 closest friends are [same race as me]
all or most of the 5 people at work with whom I work most closely are
[same race as me]




Subsequent research in Cape Town – which has distinctive demographics, with 
African and white minorities alongside a coloured near-majority – found what 
appear initially to be rather higher levels of cross-racial contact (see Figure 2).  
Only 40 percent of African and coloured respondents said that all of their five 
closest friends were from the same racial group as them, and only about 20 
percent of white respondents said the same.  For sure, large majorities of 
respondents in all three racial groups said that all or most of their closest friends 
were from the same racial group, but the data suggest that, in Cape Town at 
least, only a minority of the adult population moves in entirely mono-racial 
social circles.  Even smaller proportions of working people say that they work in 
mono-racial working environments.  But only a minority said that they had 
actually socialized with people from other racial groups in the past seven days 
(see the fourth column in each set of columns in Figure 2). 
 
The apparently higher level of inter-racial contact in Cape Town probably 
reflects two factors.  The first is methodological: the survey (the 2005 Cape 
Area Study) did not ask white and coloured respondents about their interaction 
with African people specifically, nor did it ask African people about their 
interaction with white people specifically.  It is likely that much ‘cross-racial’ 
contact is between with white and coloured people, or between African and 
coloured people, neither of which would have shown up in Gibson’s earlier 
study.  Secondly, it is likely that there are higher levels of cross-racial contact in 
urban than in rural areas.  There are certainly many more opportunities for such 
contact in urban areas. 
 
 
% agreeing with statement
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It is diffiult to understand their customs and
ways
They are untrustworthy
It is hard to imagine ever being friends with
one of them
I feel uncomfortable around them
They are racist*
I often don't believe what they say
South Africa would be a better place without
any of them
 
Note: responses to the racism question are actually disagreements with the statement ‘most … are not 
racist’.  Source: 2000-01 Truth and Reconcilation data-set; my own calculations. 
 
Figure 3. The limits to social deracialisation, 2000-01. 
 
Perhaps unsurprisingly, given the general lack of contact, Gibson found 
evidence of inter-racial suspicion and distrust on the part of non-African 
respondents towards African people and among African respondents to white 
people.  The bars in Figure 3 show the proportion of the weighted sample who 
agreed (or agreed strongly) with each of seven statements about the designated 
group.  Almost one in five South Africans agreed that South Africa would be a 
better place without the designated racial group.  Almost half agreed that they do 
not believe what members of the designated racial group said, that they feel 
uncomfortable around them, and that they find it hard to imagine ever being 
friends with one of them.  Almost two out of three South Africans agreed that it 
is difficult to understand the customs and ways of the designated group.  
Without exception, larger proportions of African respondents agreed with these 
statements about white people than did white, coloured or Indian respondents 
when asked about African people (see Gibson, 2004: 123-4).  The 2003 South 
African Social Attitudes Survey (SASAS) similarly found that large minorities 
of every racial group agreed that most members of their own racial group were 
racist, whilst a large majority of African people thought that most white people 
were racist and large majorities of white and coloured people thought that most 
African people were racist (Roefs, 2006: 89-90). 
 
Gibson shows that there is an inverse correlation between most forms of inter-
racial contact and racial distrust:  the more contact that respondents report with 
members of the designated group, the less likely they are to agree with 
statements indicating prejudice or wariness.  The exception to this is contact at 
work, which has no significant effect on inter-racial attitudes.  Gibson shows 
that contact is especially important to white, coloured and Indian respondents 
(ibid: 139-42).  
 
Limited social deracialisation does not mean that there has been no perceived 
improvement in race relations.  A series of surveys have found that South 
Africans believe that race relations have improved since the end of apartheid.  
According to Gibson’s 2001 survey, 16 percent said that race relations had 
improved a great deal, and a further 45 percent said that race relations had 
improved somewhat.  In 2003, a survey conducted by the Kaiser Family 
Foundation, the Washington Post and Harvard found that as many as 68 percent 
of South Africans believed that race relations were better than they had been 
under apartheid, and as many expected that race relations would continue to 
improve over the next five years (Hamel et al., 2004).  The 2003 SASAS also 
found that most African, coloured and Indian people (but less than half of white 
people) said that race relations had improved since 1994 (Roefs, 2006: 90-1).  
But the same surveys found evidence that improved race relations did not mean 
good race relations.  Race relations remains a pressing problem for 49 percent of 
Gibson’s respondents and a further 33 percent described them as important.   
 
 
Figure 4: Discomfort and friendship across racial 













I feel uncomfortable around people who are not [same race as me]
I do not feel uncomfortable …
I cannot imagine ever being friends with people who are not [same race as
me]
I can imagine being friends …  
  
The 2005 Cape Town survey also probed extensively the range of respondents’ 
contacts and attitudes across racial lines.  Figure 4 summarises the proportions 
of respondents agreeing and disagreeing with the statements “I feel 
uncomfortable around people who are not [same race as respondent]” and “I 
cannot imagine ever being friends with people who are not [same race as 
respondent]”.  Very small proportions of respondents who white and coloured 
respondents and only a small proportion of African respondents agreed with 
either statement.  (Again, the Cape Town survey suggests lower levels of 


















Figure 5: Attitude toward a family member marrying someone, according to race of 
respondent and of the prospective spouse 
 
 
The Cape Town survey asked more testing questions about attitudes towards 
cross-racial marriage.  All respondents were positive about marriages to 
members of their own racial group and relatively hostile to inter-racial marriage, 
but they did not discriminate significantly according to the precise inter-racial 
combination (see Figure 5).  Thus African respondents were more-or-less 
indifferent between kin marrying white and kin marrying coloured people (C), 
coloured respondents were more-or-less indifferent between white (W) and 
African (A), and white respondents were more-or-less indifferent between 
coloured, Indian (I) and African.5  (Further detail is provided in the Appendix). 
                                                 
5 It is curious that there is not more research on inter-racial relationships in post-apartheid South Africa.  There 
would be value in both accurate quantitative research and qualitative research – including into the cultural milieu 
of inter-‘racial’ households. 
Without longitudinal data, it is hard to assess just how much attitudes have 
changed over time.  Largely anecdotal evidence suggests that explicit and overt 
racism has declined.  But it seems likely that a consciousness of racial difference 
has been resilient.  If so, this is surely linked to the limited extent of residential 
desegregation or of racial integration in other spheres of life.   
 
 
Inter-Racial Integration and Interaction 
 
Patterns of residential segregation have not broken down to any great extent 
since the transition to democracy.  Analysing data from successive population 
censuses, Christopher (2001) shows that South African towns and cities began to 
desegregate, racially, in the 1990s.  White segregation levels (as measured by a 
standard segregation index) peaked in Cape Town in the 1991 census (and in 
South Africa’s other major cities in either the 1985 or 1991 censuses).  
Segregation levels for all racial groups declined between the 1991 and 1996 
censuses.  But the pace of desegregation was very slow indeed.  Christopher 
(2005) updates his analysis using 2001 census data.  Slow desegregation 
continues, but ‘the vast majority of the urban population continues to live in 
highly segregated suburbs’ (2005: 267).   
 
Indeed, most new housing areas established after the end of apartheid are as 
segregated as the older neighbourhoods established (or remade) under the 
apartheid Group Areas Act.  ‘Choices’ about where to live are, of course, 
severely limited by economic inequalities.  Prices of housing and of land make it 
almost impossible for low-income African households to move into middle class 
suburbs.  In the absence of detailed studies about ‘residential choice’, however, 
it remains unclear how important are social networks (i.e. in what other areas do 
households that might move have connections or friends) or social preferences 
(i.e. to what extent do people prefer to live in neighbourhoods with other people 
sharing a similar culture, that is to some extent coterminous with former racial 
classifications).  The fact that people were forced to move under apartheid does 
not mean that now, after apartheid, people might be making choices that reflect 
the tragic cultural legacy of apartheid itself.   
 
Although most South Africans continue to live in mono-racial neighbourhoods, 
there is a fast-growing literature on the atypical neighbourhoods where there is a 
degree of racial integration.  Residential desegregation a variety of forms, which 
can be divided into two broad categories: Existing neighbourhoods can become 
more ‘integrated’ or integration can occur through the construction of new, more 
integrated neighbourhoods.  Each of these categories can be divided into sub-
categories (see Table 1). 
Table 1: Forms of residential integration 
Category of integration Examples Studies 
1. Institutional residences (e.g. 
university residences, police 
barracks 
Many None 
2. Apartment blocks Hillbrow Morris (1999) 
3. Private housing, through 
movement of higher-income African 
people into formerly coloured/white 
areas, or of coloured people into 









4. Private housing through the 
movement of downwardly-mobile 
white people into formerly 
coloured/African areas, or of 
coloured people into formerly 
African areas 




5. State-driven low-income housing 






Dixon et al. 
(1994) 
6. Planned ‘integration’ in new 







Integration in new 
neighbourhoods 
7. Voluntary ‘integration’ in new 
private housing areas 
Summer Greens Broadbridge 
(2001) 
 
All of South Africa’s major cities have central areas of apartment blocks which 
were formerly reserved for white occupation but into which there has been very 
substantial in-migration.  The classic study of such an area is Morris’ account of 
Hillbrow, in Johannesburg, which began to desegregate as early as the late 
1970s (Morris, 1999; see also Crankshaw and White, 1995).  In Hillbrow, black 
in-migration prompted white flight, so that racial integration was temporary 
only.  Such cases presumably harden rather than dissipate racial animosity or 
ambivalence. 
 
Variant 5 also fosters relatively little actual integration.  Cases of low-income 
housing developments in middle-class suburbs, where land prices are high, 
attract considerable publicity and controversy.  In Cape Town, there are just four 
small areas of this sort (Imizamo Yethu in Hout Bay, Masiphumelele in 
Noordhoek, Westlake near Muizenberg, and Marconi Beam in Milnerton).  In 
each case, the low-income settlements grow far faster than expected and there 
are chronic problems in providing minimal services and infrastructure (yet alone 
upgrading the area).  Residents of neighbouring low-income and middle-class 
areas rarely share transport (the former use public transport, the latter private) or 
even shops (with different supermarkets catering for different groups of 
consumers), and almost never interact socially.  But it is impossible to assess 
whether negative responses from the existing, white middle-class population are 
due to their race or class (for different interpretations, see Saff, 1998; Dixon et 
al., 1994).  
 
This leaves variants 3, 6 and 7, i.e. desegregation in old or new neighbourhoods.  
There are two case-studies of variant 3 from Cape Town, of a formerly poor 
white area (Ruyterwacht) and of a mixed-income, formerly white area 
(Muizenberg).  In Ruyterwacht – which was the site of racialised and possibly 
racist protests in the early 1990s (Jung and Seekings, 1997) – low housing prices 
made it attractive for upwardly-mobile coloured households.  The non-white 
population rose from almost zero in the 1980s to 23 percent by 1996 and an 
estimated 40 percent by 2000.  Most of the new residents were young, coloured 
families, with small children.  They were better educated and had higher 
incomes than most of the existing white residents, and their houses were 
noticeable for their newly-built garages, second stories, swimming pools and 
satellite dishes.  Many of the new residents are Muslim, which might be 
expected to add another element of discord in a neighbourhood that was hitherto 
exclusively Christian.  But a typical comment from their white neighbours was 
that ‘here, our coloureds are good’ – expressing both an engagement with post-
apartheid realities and an inability to discard entirely the racial discourses of the 
past.  Faced with two incidents of rape, white and coloured neighbours joined in 
a neighbourhood watch.  In Teppo’s account, ‘hierarchist’ white residents and 
their new coloured neighbours ‘mbrace one another across racial lines, perhaps 
reluctantly at times, but knowing full well it is the only choice for both groups if 
they wish to keep their suburb secure’ (Teppo, 2004: 231). 
 
Muizenberg, on the False Bay coast, shows equally dramatic transformation 
(Lemanski, 2006c).  Between the 1996 and 2001 censuses, the white share of the 
population fell from three-quarters to only just over one-third.  Muizenberg had 
become an extraordinarily mixed area, with very similar proportions of white, 
coloured and African (including immigrant African) residents – although racial 
desegregation has been concentrated in the less expensive sections.  In 
Muizenberg, racial desegregation did not lead to social interaction and 
integration.  Most white children attend non-local schools further down the 
Peninsula, use their cars to shop outside the area, and tend to socialise 
elsewhere.  The long-standing, richer, white residents view local facilities as 
deteriorating as a result of racial and class desegregation.  Churches provide rare 
sites for racial interaction, although cross-racial membership need not mean that 
there is much inter-racial interaction. 
 
Summer Greens is an example in Cape Town of variant 7, i.e. a new, middle-
class residential area into which have moved people from different racial groups.  
Summer Greens is home to a lower middle class that combines both upwardly 
mobile African and coloured families, and downwardly mobile white ones 
(Broadbridge, 2001).  By 2000, about one half of the suburb’s residents were 
coloured, one-third white, and the rest African.  The developers encouraged a 
‘village atmosphere’ and sense of community: residents were not allowed to 
build high walls (instead, the entire suburb is walled), and the streets were 
designed to be public spaces rather than just transport routes.  Residents, 
especially those who moved here from coloured or African areas, were very 
positive about security, but few had close contact with their neighbours.  White 
residents complained about ‘low class behaviour’ by people who ‘aren’t very 
sophisticated, you know’, as well as of cultural differences.  One white man did 
not want his children to play with African children, because of the risk of AIDS.  
There were few facilities in the suburb that could facilitate inter-racial 
interaction.  The most positive interpretation is that racial integration is a slow 
progress, especially in middle-class suburbs where people emphasise their own 
privacy and have limited interaction with any neighbours. 
 
The picture in low-income areas is even less encouraging.  Researchers have 
studied two areas in Cape Town where the state explicitly sought to mix low-
income African and coloured people in public housing projects: Delft South 
(Oldfield, 2004) and Westlake (Lemanski, 2006b).  In Delft South, residents’ 
social lives, shopping patterns, and schooling divided along racial lines, as 
African and coloured residents continued to utilise the racially-defined networks 
and facilities that they had used prior to moving into a desegregated residential 
area.6  Neighbours interacted more in Westlake, however, perhaps because the 
neighbourhood’s location, surrounded by wealthy suburbs with expensive 
facilities, meant that poor African and coloured residents were compelled to use 
the same facilities because these were the only ones they could afford to use.. 
 
Overall, very few South Africans live in racially integrated neighbourhoods, and 
few of those that do so live in neighbourhoods that can be described as 
meaningfully integrated across racial lines.  Even when the market or the state 
throws people from different racial groups together in a neighbourhood, there is 
little interaction, and racial othering and prejudice remain commonplace. 
  
Whilst there has been very little residential desegregation, there has been some 
desegregation of schools.  This has been made possible by the absence of zoning 
restrictions.  Large numbers of young people do not attend the closest schools, 
and some undergo lengthy commutes to attend schools that are distant from their 
homes.  Overall, school desegregation remains modest: Most African children 
attend schools in townships or rural areas where all of the other children are also 
African.  It is only a small and fortunate minority that is able to get access to the 
better schools found in formerly coloured and, especially, formerly white areas.     
                                                 
6 My own interviews with residents of Delft indicate a deep racial divide between African and coloured 
neighbours. 
But a minority of children – including many white, Indian and coloured 
children, together with a small minority of African children – do undergo the 
experience of attending a multi-racial school.  The pioneering study of the racial 
desegregation of a public school by Dolby (2001), based on research in a 
Durban high school in 1996.  Dolby’s subject school had been a white school in 
a lower-income white residential area.  By 1996, two-thirds of the students were 
black.  The one-third that were white were typically poor-performing students 
from poorer homes who could not escape to better, more expensive schools.  
Almost all of the teachers, however, were white, and they sought to preserve the 
school’s ‘white’ identity through, for example, compelling boys to play rugby 
and wear the school blazer.  Students group along racial lines on the school 
field.  Racial epithets are common in the corridors.  The combination of 
threatened or resentful white teachers and students, and a growing majority of 
black students, made for an explosive mix. 
 
The environment at Dolby’s school was very highly racialised, but school pupils 
did not simply reproduce an apartheid-style conception of race in terms of 
biology, history or past culture.  Rather, they renegotiated race around the 
dynamics of taste (especially clothes, music and clubs).  Black pupils define 
blackness not in terms of Zulu tradition (‘this is the [19]90s’, one girl protests to 
a white teacher who anachronistically imagines that Zulu-speaking girls attend 
the ‘traditional’ Zulu reed dance) but in terms of global African-American 
culture (and icons such as Michael Jackson, Michael Jordan, Whitney Houston, 
and top rap-artists).  But coloured students also draw on African-American 
fashion in defining their cultural identity: Levi jeans, Dickies chino pants, 
baseball warm-up jackets.  White students draw on different global influences: 
more sexy clothing, techno music, and so on.  Black, Indian, coloured and white 
students value different clothes, listen to different music, play different sports, 
go to different clubs.  Deviants – such as an African girl who wears clothing 
perceived as ‘white’ – are humiliated or ostracized. By policing the adopted 
cultural markers of race, the students themselves actively reproduce racial 
difference and division. 
 
Similar research was conducted in schools in Cape Town (Soudien, 1998, 2004) 
and Johannesburg (Dawson, 2003).  Most recently, Gooskens (2006) digs into 
this same vein of research, drawing on fieldwork conducted among children 
attending a formerly white school in southern Cape Town.  Gooskens also finds 
that perceptions of similarity and difference are based on gender, lifestyle, class, 
religion, moral values and language, rather than race per se – although race 
remains ever present in their thoughts and language.  In Gooskens’ account, 
adolescents blend a rejection of racial identification or categorization with racial 
name-calling.   
Malls are an important site of inter-racial interaction.  Nkuna (2006) describes 
how young people of all races try to construct a new multi-racial identity in The 
Zone, a mall in Johannesburg.  The identity is based on similar tastes in clothing 
(specific brands), music, and other markers of fashion (hair, body piercing).  
Because these entail spending money, this is a middle class world.  Almost half 
of the young people at The Zone are students in higher education, and almost all 
attended private schools or formerly white schools in the suburbs.  Very few 
attended township schools.  The culture is not only consumerist, but embraces 
American styles whilst rejecting ‘parochial’ South African fashions (such as 
kwaito music). 
 
Survey data suggest that the workplace is an important site of inter-racial 
interaction.  The 2005 Cape Area Study found that very small minorities of each 
race group said that they worked in mono-racial environments (see Figure 2 
above).  Unfortunately, there appears to be almost no published research on the 
everyday reality of inter-racial interactions in the post-apartheid workplace.  
Recent studies provide only snippets of information or analysis on race.  Von 
Holdt (2003, 2005) provides a compelling account of the importance of race in 
understanding dynamics in a steelmill at the end of apartheid, but his research 
stops in the mid-1990s.  He emphasizes how the job colour bar and racial 
segregation of facilities were accompanied by the routine use of violence to 
maintain white baaskap (supremacy).7  Bezuidenhout (2005) describes four 
engineering factories, where the basic racial order has barely changed with the 
transition from apartheid to democracy, although there is no suggestion that it is 
maintained now through violence.  He also points to the racialised perception 
among African workers that they are still discriminated against, even though this 
discrimination is now based on seniority within the company rather than 
(explicitly) race.  Kenny’s (2005) study of supermarkets points to the 
importance of white security personnel in perpetuating a racial order.  The most 
interesting window into race in the workplace is in research by a black scholar in 
a car-manufacturing plant.  ’Ordinary workers’, Masondo writes, ‘feel more 
comfortable’ in mono-racial social groups, especially because of linguistic 
barriers.  But black and white salaried staff do interact: they ‘are always together 
during lunch hours’ (Masondo, 2005: 165).  Black workers complain that the 
new black managers ‘treat us the same way as the white managers did.  They 
shout at us as if we are their children.’ (168). 
 
Racial interactions in the workplace clearly warrant further research.  To what 
extent, or in what ways, or how often, do inter-racial interactions transcend 
workplace hierarchies?  What are the consequences of racialised hierarchy (or 
its erosion) in the workplace for the reproduction (or erosion) of race-thinking? 
                                                 
7 Carrim (1986) provided a much more optimistic account of African-Indian interactions. 
 Discriminatory Attitudes and Experiences  
 
Ethnographic research in neighbourhoods and schools suggests that racial 
differences and divisions remain pronounced, but finds little evidence of the 
kind of brutal racism associated with white South Africans in the early apartheid 
period.  Experimental research on behaviour and survey –based research on 
attitudes supports this assessment.  Experimental research on race has been 
pioneered in South Africa by Justine Burns.  In one of Burns’ experiments, 
secondary school students in Cape Town played the ‘dictator game’, in which 
players are given money and then choose how much to pass onto anonymous 
‘partners’, whose photo they have seen but otherwise know nothing about.  
Using a photo allowed Burns to test for the effect of the partners’ race, or at 
least race in terms of physical appearance.  Burns found that there was no direct 
race effect, i.e. that players did not discriminate against partners who appeared 
to be racially different.  This behaviour appeared to be motivated by an aversion 
to inherited inequality, and racial appearance was taken as a proxy for inherited 
inequality (Burns, 2004).  
 
The participants in Burns’ experiments know that they are in an experiment, and 
this might affect their behaviour.  The participants do not know, however, that 
inter-racial interaction is the focus of the research.  In surveys, respondents 
might also select responses in the knowledge that they are being researched, but 
the use of ‘vignettes’ can help to disguise the focus of the research.  
Respondents are presented with one or more vignettes describing a situation, 
followed by a question or series of questions related to the situation.  Sniderman 
and Piazza (1993) used vignettes to examine ‘modern’ forms of racism in the 
USA.  In their ‘laid-off worker’ vignette, respondents were presented with a 
scenario in which a person (or subject) is retrenched, and are then invited to 
suggest how much (if any) financial assistance that person should receive from 
the government whilst looking for work.  The scenario varies insofar as the 
subject (or retrenched person) is given different characteristics: white or black, 
male or female, younger or older, single or married, with or without children, 
and dependable or not dependable.  The 2003 Cape Area Study, conducted with 
a small sample in Cape Town, employed a variant of the ‘laid-off worker’ 
vignette to probe the effects of race on perceptions of distributive justice By 
including a range of characteristics for each subject, the respondent’s attention is 
being diverted in part at least from the racial characteristic.   
 
Questions about distributive justice are a telling test of one dimension of racial 
attitudes because the official ideology of apartheid emphasised that each racial 
group (and each ethnic group within the African population) should look after its 
own: white South Africans were not responsible for the poverty of black South 
Africans; rich South Africans were only responsible for poor South Africans if 
they were members of the same racially-demarcated ‘community’.  One might 
expect that the over-riding racialisation of society under apartheid and the 
continuing salience of race have resulted in a close correlation between race and 
attitudes toward distribution or distributive justice.  The government, African 
National Congress and the media frequently accuse white South Africans of 
being opposed to ‘transformation’, i.e. to redistributive social and economic 
policies.  If this was the case, then we would expect to find that South Africans 
will assess the desert of other members of their own racial group (i.e. ‘insiders’) 
more favourably or positively than that of members of other racial groups (i.e. 
‘outsiders’). 
 
The results of the ‘laid-off worker’ experiment in Cape Town in 2003 suggested 
that the race of the respondent and the race of the subject were of little import in 
whether a respondent considered a subject deserving.  For example, white 
respondents did not discriminate significantly against African or coloured 
subjects.  But there were clear (and counter-intuitive) race effects on the amount 
that the respondent said that the subject should receive per month from the 
government.  White respondents were more generous, perhaps because they had 
a more inflated view of what constituted a ‘minimum’ income; more curiously, 
black and coloured respondents as well as white respondents suggested that 
larger grants be made to white than to African or coloured subjects (Seekings, 
2005). 
 
The 2005 Cape Area Study extended this vignette (as well as asking several 
other vignette-style questions), with a larger sample, but also confined to Cape 
Town.  Instead of asking about the scenario of a retrenched worker, respondents 
in 2005 were presented with a wider range of circumstances in which a subject 
might be considered deserving of financial assistance.  Respondents were first 
told that ‘The government provides grants to some people in need, for example 
old-age pensions to elderly people.  I am going to describe a situation, and then 
ask you what the government should do to help the person involved.’  A specific 
subject was then described.  The subjects varied between interviews.  Firstly, the 
general circumstances of the subject varied.  Some subjects were described as 
retrenched workers, others as people who were sick; some were disabled and 
others abandoned by husbands; and so on.  A range of other social and 
demographic characteristics – including race – were varied also.  The 2005 data 
showed most of the same patterns as the 2003 data: the race of the subject made 
little or no difference, white respondents were a little less positive in their initial 
assessment of desert, but a lot more generous in the sums they ‘awarded’.  
Unlike 2003, there was no indication that respondents were more generous to 
white subjects.  In this dimension of social attitudes, race plays little effect, and 
there is no little or no evidence of racism or racial discrimination.  These 
findings from survey vignettes are not dissimilar to Burns’ findings using data 
from field experiments. 
 
White South Africans have no qualms, however, in expressing opposition to 
race-based policies, such as affirmative action and BEE.  Several studies suggest 
that there is wide and strong support for government interventions to help the 
poor, but only among African people is there a majority in favour of race-based 
affirmative action (in employment), black economic empowerment or 
redistribution of land (ILO, 2004; Roberts, 2006). 
 
Survey data suggest that most South Africans believe that ‘race relations’ have 
improved since the end of apartheid, and neither surveys nor field experiments 
provide evidence of significant racial discrimination in attitudes or experimental 
behaviour.  But discrimin-ation might persist in other domains, and it is even 
more likely that discrimination is perceived as continuing. 
 
The 2005 Cape Area Study asked about recent experiences of discrimination.  
Respondents were asked whether, in the five years since 2000, they had ‘been 
treated worse than other people or benefited’ because of their race.  Very few 
respondents said that they had experienced negative racial discrimination (see 
Figure 6).  Most African respondents said that they had benefited because they 
were black, whilst most coloured and white respondents said that they had 
neither benefited not been treated worse. 
 
Figure 6: Experiences of discrimination in past 5 years, by 
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This was followed by a series of questions about experiences in specific settings 
(see Figure 7).  Almost all African respondents reported that they had been 
watched or followed in shops, compared to a minority of coloured respondents 
and very few white respondents.  Larger proportions of African respondents than 
coloured or white respondents reported experiencing each of the other four 
situations (being treated with less respect, being treated worse in restaurants and 
shops, being treated by people as if they were afraid of you, and being treated by 
other people as if they were better than you).  But in these other four situations 
the proportions of African, coloured and white respondents who reported that 
they had had the experience were not massively different.  For example, just 
over one half of African respondents reported being treated with less respect, 
compared to over one-third of coloured and white respondents. 
 
These results are broadly consistent with the findings of the countrywide 2003 
SASAS.  Most South Africans reported that they never feel that they are being 
discriminated against.  A larger minority of white and Indian people report 
experiencing discrimination than among African or coloured people.  
Discrimination is perceived as occurring primarily at work (especially by 
African people), when applying for jobs (especially among white and coloured 
people), and in shops (especially among white people, curiously) (Roefs, 2006: 
88-9). 
 
Figure 7: Experiences of discrimination, Cape Town, 2005:
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Unfortunately there is no experimental research in South Africa similar to the 
work conduced by Pager in the USA, assessing the extent and patterns of racial 
(or other) discrimination in the labour market.  If such research was conducted, 
however, it is likely that it would find that in occupations in which they are 
applicants from all racial groups (i.e. excluding unskilled employment), racial 
discrimination is practiced in favour of black applicants through affirmative 
action and BEE policies. 
 
 
Discrimination and Disadvantage 
 
The effects of race in the labour market were much studied in the early 1990s.  
From the 1920s to the 1970s, racial discrimination generally confined African 
people to low-paid occupations.  When African and white people were in the 
same occupation – for examples, teaching and the police – white employees 
were paid more than their African counterparts.  But this picture began to 
change dramatically from the 1970s.  Crankshaw (1997) demonstrated the 
steady, and at times rapid, rise of African workers into better-paid occupations 
in the later apartheid period.  Moll (2000) showed that the share of inequality in 
the distribution of wages that was accounted for by inter-racial differences 
declined from 65 percent in 1980 to 42 percent in 1993, whilst the share 
accounted for by intra-racial differences rose from 35 percent to 58 percent.  The 
racial wage gap declined but still remained large, with median earnings for 
African workers only about one-quarter of the median for white workers, in 
1995 (Bhorat and Leibbrandt, 2001: 83; see also Burger and Woolard, 2005: 
19).  But a series of studies demonstrated that this persistent racial wage gap was 
due primarily to differences in education, skill, location (urban/rural), and 
economic sector, rather than by racial discrimination per se.  Moll (2000) also 
found that racial discrimination amounted to 20 percent of mean African wage 
in 1980 but just 12 percent in 1993.  Whilst several other studies used data from 
the mid-1990s to re-examine racial wage discrimination, there has been a dearth 
of studies using post-1995 data.  Several recent studies of the labour market pay 
no attention at all to racial discrimination, focusing instead on the 
unambiguously pressing topic of unemployment and job creation (e.g. Burger 
and Woolard, 2005; Oosthuizen, 2006).8 
 
There appears to be just one study of racial discrimination using post-1995 data.  
Burger and Jafta (2006) uses a set of decomposition techniques on data from 
OHSs and LFSs between 1995 and 2004 to assess changes over time in the 
‘unexplained’ part of the racial gap in both racial employment and (formal 
sector) wage gaps. – with ‘unexplained’ meaning unexplained by other readily 
measured variables such as years of schooling and location.  They find that there 
has been a narrowing of the racial wage gap since 1994 at the top end of the 
wage distribution, but not overall.  The unexplained element remains, i.e. being 
white apparently continues to earn a premium in the labour market, essentially 
                                                 
8 Some studies persist in the tradition of Mbeki’s “two nations” analysis.  Moleke (2006), for example, concludes 
that ‘race still matters’ and ‘the labour market is far from being deracialised’ on the basis of evidence of racial 
inequalities, i.e. differences in living conditions, skills and so on between the ‘average’ white person and average 
African person.  This kind of analysis implicitly defines racialisation in terms that render it impossible to 
deracialise the labour market: given persisting inequalities within the African population, ‘deracialisation’ would 
require reducing the skills and living conditions of a large portion of each generation of white South Africans to 
the levels of their most disadvantaged African compatriots.  
because white people earn higher returns on their education than do Indian, 
coloured or, especially, African people. 
 
As most of these econometric studies emphasise, returns to education surely 
continue to vary by race because of the enormous but unmeasured differences in 
the quality of education, combined with the similarly unmeasured benefits that 
social capital bring to young people from middle-class backgrounds.  Taking 
such factors into account would surely reduce considerably the ‘unexplained’ 
component of the racial wage gap, and reduce further the importance of racial 
discrimination relative to other factors such as inequalities in real skills and 
useful contacts.   
 
Burger and Jafta’s work points to the importance of distinguishing between 
different sections of the labour market.  Unlike in (say) Brazil or the USA, there 
are few unskilled white workers competing with black workers for low-paid 
employment (and of the small number of unskilled white workers, some might 
have hidden class advantages, for example young people with part-time jobs as 
waitresses).  It is at the top end of the labour market that the effects of persistent 
racial discrimination against African people or affirmative action in their benefit 
would be concentrated.  There are unfortunately few studies of the top end of the 
labour market, especially among young entrants.  But some data suggests that, in 
some sectors, patterns of discrimination have changed markedly over very short 
periods of time.  In the late 1990s, the public sector was the primary venue for 
affirmative action.  The proportion of public sector managers who were African 
rose from 30 percent in 1995 to 51 percent in 2001.  The proportion of senior 
managers who were African rose from 33 percent to 43 percent (Thompson and 
Woolard, 2002).  As many as 70 percent of all African graduates get their first 
job in the public sector (cited in Altman, 2006: 69).  In the early 2000s, 
legislation has pushed larger private sector employers to similar shifts in 
employment patterns.  There has also been a dramatic shrinkage in the racial 
wage gap among managers (cited in Altman, 2006). 
 
A second, complicating factor in the analysis of racial discrimination in labour 
market outcomes (i.e. employment and wages) using cross-sectional data is that 
substantial numbers of younger white people have emigrated, or are at least 
outside of the country for long periods of time.  Whilst they might be outside the 
South African labour market, their choice is probably not entirely exogenous to 
conditions in the labour market.  I am unaware of any studies that examine the 
real effects of affirmative action legislation on the labour market for school-
leavers or, especially, university graduates, but there is no shortage of anecdotal 
evidence that young white men and women believe that affirmative action 
policies and practices are foreclosing opportunities for employment, and that 
this perception influences decisions about emigration.  If it was true that white 
graduates are emigrating to avoid unemployment (perhaps because they would 
‘choose’ unemployment over employment in occupations that are inferior to 
those to which they aspired), then emigration would cause analyses of cross-
sectional data to under-estimate the effects of affirmative action. 
 
Panel studies offer a promising way forward for the empirical analysis of 
patterns and dynamics of advantage and disadvantage in post-apartheid South 
Africa.  One such study is the Cape Area Panel Study (CAPS), which 
interviewed a representative sample of almost 5,000 young people (aged 
between 14 and 22) in 2002, and has since re-interviewed this panel three times 
(in 2003-04, 2005, and 2006) (see Lam et al., 2005).   CAPS has collected 
detailed data on schooling and entry into the labour market, as well as on sexual 
and reproductive health and experiences within families and households.  Most 
data are collected from the young people themselves, but data are also collected 
from parents and other older household members, and data on individuals and 
households have been combined with community- and school-level data.  The 
problem with panel studies is that data-collection and -cleaning are so time-
consuming that there are inevitable delays before panel data are available for 
analysis and longer delays before analyses are completed.9  A second problem is 
that attrition results in incomplete data.  Given the difficulties of collecting data 
from or on emigrants, it is likely that CAPS will be able to offer only a partial 
picture of how and why and with what consequences young people enter the 
labour market.  The South African Human Sciences Research Council is also 
conducting panel studies among cohorts of matriculants (i.e. students writing the 
grade 12 examination) and university graduates, which will provide a fuller 
picture of what is happening at the top end of the labour market. 
 
It is likely, however, that panel studies will confirm the following.  Most 
children from poor neighbourhoods – almost all of whom are African – grow up 
in home environments that are unconducive to educational success, and attend 
schools where the quality of education is very poor.  Many remain in school 
until their late teens, but are unable to acquire many skills.  Their ability to find 
employment is constrained by their lack of skills and experience, their location 
far from most job opportunities, and their lack of contacts with jobs who could 
help them find employment.  Many move into the underclass of chronically 
unemployed, with intermittent short spells of unskilled work.  On the other 
hand, children from middle-class neighbourhoods – who comprise rapidly rising 
numbers of African as well as Indian and white children – attend better schools, 
enjoy the benefits of middle-class home environments, and gain work 
experience through part-time jobs (especially in school holidays).  They move 
into higher education and then into the labour market.  White middle-class 
                                                 
9 Most data from the first three waves of CAPS became available publicly and for free, over the internet, in 
December 2006. 
children enjoy the relative benefits of wider and deeper social networks, but the 





The available evidence suggests that race remains of enormous social and 
cultural importance despite a decline in economic importance.  Earnings and 
incomes reflect race far more than class.  This raises questions, however, about 
the meaning of class in the South African context.  In its intellectual seedbed in 
north-west Europe during the industrial revolution, there was generally a close 
relationship between ‘objective’ class positions (in terms of relationships to the 
means of production) and everyday cultures.  As E.P.Thompson argued 
famously, the working class was made culturally as well as  through changes in 
the form and shape of capitalism.  In South Africa, ‘race’ – understood as a 
social and cultural phenomenon, not biologically – has shaped profoundly 
cultural change, interacting complexly with the growth of modern state and a 
capitalist economy. 
 
Insofar as this is the case, then South Africa would appear to be the opposite to 
Brazil, where race is of limited cultural and even social importance but of 
continuing economic signifance.  In the terms used by Telles (2005), in Brazil 
there is racism in terms of vertical relations but not of horizontal relations, 
whilst in South Africa there is racism in terms of horizontal relations but not of 
vertical relations.  In Brazil, inter-racial marriage and racial discrimination in 
employment are both common.  In South Africa, after apartheid (and subject to 
caution with respect to the extent and effect of affirmative action), neither is 
common. 
 
But the available evidence on post-apartheid South Africa is sadly limited.  
Little progress has been made yet with respect to two key kinds of study.  First, 
data from panel studies is yet to be used to explore precisely how and why ‘race’ 
shapes progress through  school and into the labour market.  Secondly, there are 
still too few studies of how race, class and culture are made and understood in 
the lived experience of South Africans, at home, in neighbourhoods, in schools 
and in workplaces.10  In addition, there is a dearth of empirical research on how 
employers and others comply with official requirements to categorise people,11 
and on the extent or effects of pro-African racial discrimination (i.e. affirmative 
                                                 
10 Such studies might usefully draw on Bourdieu. 
11 Teppo (2004: 209-10) has a wonderful account of how school teachers do so: by getting the students 
themselves, collectively, to count students by race. 
action) in employment.12  In South Africa, as in Brazil, we are only beginning to 
unravel the complicated interactions of race, class and culture in the 
contemporary context.  
 
 
                                                 
12 The case of the University of Cape Town (UCT) might be instructive.  The Employment Equity Act requires 
employers such as UCT to determine targets for racial transformation, and to report on their progress in meeting 
these targets.  In the absence of will to retrench long-standing employees – i.e. staff appointed under apartheid – 
employers have to achieve transformation through the slow pace of natural turnover.  This means that most or all 
new appointments have to be from designated groups.  Whatever the rhetoric of formal policy declarations, the 
reality of appointments is increasingly that young white men, and to a lesser extent young white women, cannot 
be appointed to permanent positions.  ‘Transformation’ is slow, but there is in effect a ‘colour bar’ on young 
academic appointments, as there was under apartheid. 
Appendix 
 
Attitudes towards inter-racial marriage within family, by race of respondent 
and race of prospective spouse 




Black/African coloured indian white 
mean 1.75 -0.15 -0.49 -0.16 
sd 0.75 1.49 1.44 1.47 African 
n 408 408 408 408 
mean 0.55 1.26 0.63 0.78 
sd 1.21 0.96 1.17 1.13 Coloured 
n 478 478 478 478 
mean -0.25 -0.02 -0.12 0.87 
sd 1.08 1.05 1.03 1.02 White 
n 252 252 252 252 
mean 0.68 0.64 -0.28 0.61 
sd 1.52 1.33 1.52 1.35 Other 
n 35 35 35 35 
Note: possible scores range from -2 to +2; negative scores indicate disapproval, positive scores 
approval.  sd standard deviation. 
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